Narendra Modi (L) with Xi Jinping during the October 2024 meeting in Kazan, Russia. (File photo)
The arrival of China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, in New Delhi on August 18 for the 24th round of special representatives’ talks on the disputed border represents far more than routine diplomacy. It signals a strategic recalibration of Asian geopolitics, driven by the disruptive policies of the second Trump administration.
As someone who commanded troops across all sectors of the line of actual control (LAC) during his military career, this author views this diplomatic thaw with cautious optimism – recognizing both its potential and inherent limitations.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s possible first visit to China in seven years for the upcoming Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Tianjin may well mark a watershed moment in India-China relations. Ironically, it appears to be catalysed by the unintended consequences of the buccaneer-style foreign policy of the United States president, Donald Trump.
Galwan 2020: When Trust Collapsed
The savage hand-to-hand combat on the intervening night of June 15 and 16, 2020, in eastern Ladakh’s Galwan valley fundamentally altered the trajectory of India-China relations. The death of 20 Indian soldiers, including Colonel B Santosh Babu, commanding officer of 16 Bihar Regiment, represented more than a tactical skirmish – it shattered four decades of carefully managed border protocols. The author must mention here that although China acknowledged the death of just four People’s Liberation Army soldiers, Beijing has never disclosed the true scale of its losses.
What made Galwan particularly devastating was not just the violence itself, but what preceded it. China had systematically attempted to alter the status quo along the LAC, constructing infrastructure in mutually agreed buffer zones. The PLA had violated fundamental agreements by advancing beyond established patrol points and constructing permanent structures.
The clash itself – fought with stones and nail-studded clubs in subzero temperatures – reflected the broader breakdown of trust mechanisms that had prevented such confrontations since 1975.
The aftermath proved equally destructive to bilateral relations. India suspended direct flights, froze border trade, and systematically rejected Chinese foreign direct investment applications – 10 in 2021, 33 in 2022, and 15 in 2023. The economic decoupling extended beyond immediate security concerns, reflecting a fundamental reassessment of China as a strategic partner.
Border infrastructure development accelerated dramatically. India added 40 new border outposts and advanced 56 existing posts closer to the LAC, while monthly patrol frequencies increased substantially. The message was clear: India would not allow another Galwan.
Read also: India’s Eastern Front – New battleground that could eclipse Pakistan
Pakistan: China’s Strategic Chess Piece
China’s systematic military enhancement of Pakistan represents perhaps its most effective strategy for containing India’s rise. The China-Pakistan joint challenge is unmistakable and has reached unprecedented sophistication.
Beijing has supplied nearly $20 billion worth of advanced military equipment to Pakistan, transforming it into a showcase for Chinese defence exports and creating a formidable western front that diverts Indian resources and attention from the China border.
Most concerning from an Indian perspective is US intelligence confirming China’s role in Pakistan’s weapons of mass destruction programme. Islamabad now possesses approximately 170 nuclear warheads – a capability that has fundamentally altered South Asian deterrence calculations.
But perhaps even more destabilizing is China’s continued support for Pakistan’s proxy warfare against India. Beijing’s silence on cross-border terrorism emanating from Pakistani soil represents a fundamental impediment to normalizing India-China relations. Any sustainable détente must acknowledge that one of India’s non-negotiable red lines is Pakistan-sponsored transborder terrorism. Beijing cannot expect to rebuild trust with New Delhi while simultaneously enabling Islamabad’s continued sponsorship of terrorist activities against Indian interests.
The strategic logic is transparent: bog India down in South Asia through the Pakistan proxy, preventing New Delhi from focusing resources on the China challenge. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, with its $62 billion investment, provides Beijing with significant leverage over Islamabad’s (read Rawalpindi’s) decision-making, essentially making Pakistan a strategic client state dependent on Chinese largesse.
Read also: Devil’s Triangle – India’s strategic nightmare that could choke northeast
The Trump Blunder
Meanwhile, the recklessly swashbuckling behaviour of the 47th US president has upended established diplomatic, trade, and strategic ties between Washington and other world capitals. The second Trump administration has fundamentally disrupted the established US-India strategic convergence through punitive economic measures that border on economic warfare. The imposition of 50% tariffs on Indian goods – the highest levied against any Asian trading partner – represents a seismic shift in American priorities.
These measures, initially triggered by India’s continued purchase of Russian oil, have escalated to threaten India’s $87 billion annual exports to the US, equivalent to 2.5% of India’s GDP. The timing and severity reflect Trump’s transactional approach to international relations.
Trump initially imposed a 25% tariff on August 1, followed by an additional 25% on August 6, bringing total tariffs to 50%. Industry estimates suggest a potential $4–5 billion drop in engineering exports alone, with overall GDP growth forecasts revised downward from 6.5% to as low as 6%.
Sectors including textiles, gems and jewellery, leather, and marine products face existential challenges as Indian exporters lose competitiveness to rivals in Vietnam and Bangladesh.
Simultaneously, Trump has embraced Pakistan with unprecedented warmth. He hosted Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, for a private White House lunch in June 2025 – the first time a US president has received a Pakistani military leader without civilian officials present.
Trump’s praise for Munir’s role in “preventing nuclear war” with India and his interest in establishing “mutually beneficial trade relationships with Pakistan” signals a dramatic realignment of American priorities in South Asia.
This shift becomes more pronounced when contrasted with Trump’s threats of additional 10% tariffs on BRICS members for pursuing “anti-American policies”. The administration’s apparent preference for Pakistan over India in regional conflict management represents a fundamental departure from decades of US policy.
Read also: China’s Brahmaputra Gambit – A strategic assessment of Motuo dam
The Thaw: Reading Between the Lines
Against this backdrop of American economic pressure and Pakistani military enhancement, Wang’s three-day visit to New Delhi assumes extraordinary strategic significance.
The October 2024 meeting between Modi and the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, at the BRICS summit in Kazan created the framework for this diplomatic re-engagement. The discussions included resuming border trade in locally manufactured goods, restoring direct passenger flights suspended since 2020, and implementing disengagement agreements in Depsang Plains and Demchok.
Wang’s meeting with Modi on August 19 evening symbolically marks the highest-level engagement between the countries since 2020. According to percolating reports at the time of writing this, the discussions focused on advancing military and diplomatic discussions following the 2020 border standoff in eastern Ladakh and exploring ways to ease tensions and strengthen communication.
This, in the author’s view, is Beijing’s effort to create sufficient trust to enable Modi’s China visit for the SCO summit, scheduled for August 31-September 1 in Tianjin. Xi wants to showcase the Tianjin SCO summit as a grand success before the US-led west, which even his “adversary” Modi has attended. If this happens, it will mark Modi’s first visit to China since the informal summit in Wuhan in 2018 – a significant diplomatic breakthrough.
In any case, both New Delhi and Beijing know that the practical cooperation areas extend beyond border management, which include potential lifting of restrictions on Chinese investments, resumption of connectivity projects, and coordination in multilateral forums like BRICS and SCO to counter western economic pressure.
Read also: Network-Centric Warfare – Pakistan’s edge and India’s wake-up call
Why Détente Makes Strategic Sense
The convergence of Chinese and Indian interests reflects the unintended consequences of Trump’s economic nationalism. Both Asian giants face American pressure – China through trade wars and technological restrictions, India through punitive tariffs and diplomatic isolation.
This external pressure creates natural incentives for cooperation that were absent during more benign international environments. A calibrated approach with China – employing both pragmatism and prudence – represents a far more dignified option than capitulating to Trump’s economic coercion. Bending before such pressure would compromise India’s self-esteem, diminish its international standing, and undermine the very sovereignty that our soldiers defend on those Himalayan ridgelines.
From India’s perspective, managing the China relationship becomes essential for several reasons. First, the joint Pakistan-China challenge remains manageable only if border tensions are controlled. Second, economic pragmatism demands stable relations with India’s largest trading partner, particularly when facing American market restrictions.
Third, multilateral forums like BRICS and SCO provide alternative platforms for global engagement when traditional western partnerships prove unreliable.
China’s calculations appear equally pragmatic. Beijing recognizes that sustained confrontation with India while managing American containment efforts stretches Chinese resources unnecessarily. The Galwan experience demonstrated that military confrontation with India carries significant costs without strategic benefits.
More importantly, enlisting India’s cooperation in alternative global governance structures serves China’s broader objective of challenging American hegemony.
Read also: Beijing cannot dictate the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation
Beijing’s Greater Motivations
Why is China signalling a thaw now? The reasons are multiple and interconnected.
China’s economy is facing significant headwinds, with foreign investment inflows weakening and domestic consumption struggling. The country’s property sector crisis and youth unemployment have created internal pressures that require external stability.
Confrontation with the US remains intense across multiple domains – trade, technology, military positioning in the South China Sea, and the Taiwan question. Stabilizing one frontier allows Beijing to concentrate resources elsewhere.
China also wishes to prevent India from drifting fully into the western camp. Beijing recognizes that India is a central pillar of the Indo-Pacific strategy, a Quad member, and a rising market power. By offering economic inducements – resumption of border trade through the Lipulekh trijunction in Uttarakhand or Nathu-la in Sikkim, or selective access to rare earths and fertilizer inputs – Beijing hopes to keep India strategically ambiguous.
However, we must not be naive. The PLA has shown little inclination to vacate the buffer zones it forced into existence after April 2020. Talk of peace without verifiable ground changes remains largely theatrical.
Read also: With FM Munir in Pak’s charge, India must see the ‘black swan’ coming
New Delhi’s Three Imperatives
As a soldier-turned-analyst, this author sees three broad imperatives for India in navigating this complex landscape.
First, the security ledger: No diplomatic thaw should come at the cost of accepting diluted patrol rights for our soldiers at the LAC. Maps and patrol logs must return to the pre-Galwan pattern. Our soldiers deserve clarity, not ambiguity, when they step onto those ridges and “fingers”.
The recent agreements on Depsang and Demchok patrolling arrangements offer hope, but verification remains crucial. India must insist on restoration of patrol points that existed before April 2020, not accept new arrangements that legitimize Chinese gains.
Second, the economic balance: With tariffs choking exports, India may be tempted to lean on Chinese supply chains for critical inputs – pharmaceutical ingredients, green technology components, and electronics. This must be pursued only with robust safeguards: investment screening, restrictions in telecom and data sectors, and parallel diversification to trusted partners. However, New Delhi must insist on getting unrestricted access to things from China that are critical for India’s economy, like rare earths, pharmaceutical APIs, fertilizers, etc.
The lessons from the 2020 economic decoupling must not be forgotten. Strategic autonomy requires reducing dependencies in critical sectors while engaging pragmatically in others.
Third, the maritime dimension: China’s arming of Pakistan at sea cannot go unanswered. India must accelerate induction of new submarines, upgrade existing maritime patrol platforms, and expand logistics agreements with partners, such as France, Oman, and the UAE.
Control of the Arabian Sea remains central to India’s strategic freedom. Chinese-built submarines operating under Pakistani colours represent a direct challenge to India’s maritime security.
Read also: India mustn’t take Pakistan COAS’s promotion to field marshal lightly
Politics of Optics vs Substance
Modi’s possible visit to Beijing will undoubtedly be projected as statesmanship. For domestic audiences, it may seem like the statesman calming the northern frontier. But the opposition will rightly ask: what has been gained? Have our patrol rights been restored? Has China acknowledged its aggression?
For Xi, the optics of hosting Modi will signal to the world that Beijing can manage its disputes responsibly. Yet, in the very same week, Chinese-made submarines may slip into the Arabian Sea under Pakistani colours. Symbolism should not obscure substance.
The Americans, meanwhile, must recognize that by squeezing India economically while flattering Pakistan militarily, they may achieve the opposite of their intended goals. Instead of pulling India closer, they risk nudging New Delhi towards hedging with Beijing.
Read also: Threat of China annexing Tawang is real. What must India do?
Red Lines and Bottom Lines
India’s red lines must be made unambiguous. We cannot, and must not, accept the 1959 Chinese definition of the LAC. We cannot institutionalize buffer zones that freeze us out of our own patrolling areas for our soldiers and grazing areas for our shepherds. And we cannot let disengagement agreements remain unpublished, shrouded in secrecy.
Any meaningful engagement must be predicated on the principles of mutual respect, mutual sensitivity, and mutual interest. These are not mere diplomatic platitudes but essential foundations for sustainable relations between two ancient civilizations. Beijing must demonstrate sensitivity to India’s core concerns, just as New Delhi acknowledges China’s legitimate interests where they do not compromise Indian sovereignty.
Negotiables do exist – such as sequencing. India can open limited cultural exchanges, resume academic linkages, or allow controlled trade, provided verifiable progress occurs on the ground. However, until soldiers walk again where they did before April 2020, the border cannot be called “normal”.
Read also: India @ 75 – New Delhi’s security challenges and path forward
We must also watch three developments closely in the coming year: whether China makes real concessions in Depsang and Demchok; whether Pakistan’s navy fields Hangor submarines in operational numbers; and whether the United States moderates its tariff policy.
The border-management framework emerging from recent agreements offers a model for controlled competition. Regular patrolling schedules, advance notification mechanisms, and enhanced communication protocols can prevent tactical incidents from escalating into strategic crises.
Economic cooperation offers the most promising avenue for building sustainable ties. Resuming Chinese investment in non-sensitive sectors, expanding border trade, and developing infrastructure connectivity can create mutual dependencies that make conflict costlier. However, strategic sectors including telecommunications, defence technology, and critical minerals will remain contested domains regardless of diplomatic warming.
Read also: India must move earnestly and quickly to settle border dispute with China
The Final Measure
As a soldier who has stood guard on the grey mountains of eastern Ladakh in snow and storm, this author remains wary. Détente has its place in statecraft, but it cannot be built on strategic amnesia. To shake hands with China is acceptable; to forget Galwan is not.
The true measure of any Modi-Xi meeting will not be the smiles at the upcoming SCO summit or future gatherings in the Great Hall of the People or in New Delhi. It will be whether an Indian patrol once again raises the tricolour on the very ridgelines where blood was spilled on June 15-16, 2020.
Until then, peace remains an aspiration, not a reality.
Modi’s China visit will serve as the first major test of whether both leaders can demonstrate that tactical cooperation enhances rather than undermines their respective strategic positions. If that happens, Wang’s current visit may indeed be remembered as the moment when the post-Galwan freeze began to thaw.
But for now, we must remain vigilant guardians of our sovereignty while engaging pragmatically with our greatest strategic challenge. The mountains remember what diplomats sometimes forget.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in the article are the author’s own and don’t necessarily reflect the views of India Sentinels.
Follow us on social media for quick updates, new photos, videos, and more.
X: https://twitter.com/indiasentinels
Facebook: https://facebook.com/indiasentinels
Instagram: https://instagram.com/indiasentinels
YouTube: https://youtube.com/indiasentinels
© India Sentinels 2025-26
